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Prior scholarship on the effect of the increasing number of female judges leads to three contrasting 
sets of expectations. Early writings and views of affirmative-action activists suggested that female 
judges would be more liberal than male judges. On the other hand, a series of empirical studies suggest 
that we should expect no gender differences. In contrast to both of these perspectives, several feminist 
scholars suggest that women will be more liberal only when that position expresses support for full 
participation in the community. These contrasting expectations were tested by analyzing the votes of 
appeals court decisions in three issue areas. No differences were discovered between male and female 
judges in obscenity or criminal search and seizure cases. However, in employment discrimination cases, 
female judges were significantly more liberal than their male colleagues. 
INTRODUCTION 
O nly eight women had served as federal judges before 1977 when President 
Jimmy Carter instituted a plan to diversify the federal courts.1 Carter's reforms 
resulted in the appointment of 11 women to the United States Courts of Appeals 
and 29 to the federal district courts. Subsequently, Presidents Ronald Reagan and 
George Bush appointed a total of six women to the Courts of Appeals.2 Although 
the number of women on the federal intermediate appellate bench remains rela- 
tively small, that number is large enough to make it possible, indeed, essential to 
begin to study their decision making. In the present study we analyze the behavior 
of judges on the United States Courts of Appeals to discover whether differences 
in voting behavior may be attributed to the gender of the judge. 
I See Berkson and Carbon (1980). See Martin (1982, 1987). For documentation of the underrepre- 
sentation of women on the bench, see Cook (1988). 
2Ronald Reagan appointed four women and George Bush had appointed two as of August 1990. 
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Previous Studies Comparing Male and Female Decision Makers 
Advocates of diversification of the federal bench hoped that increasing the num- 
ber of women would not only give qualified women professional opportunities that 
had long been denied to them but would also enhance the legitimacy of the judi- 
ciary insofar as the courts would begin more accurately to reflect the composition 
of the general population. Many supporters of Carter's efforts to increase the 
number of women on the federal courts also hoped that women judges would ac- 
tually represent women's interests. One scholar, for example, explained that, "The 
organized campaign to place more women on the bench rests on the hope that 
women judges will seize decision-making opportunities to liberate other women" 
(Cook 1981, 216). Critics of Carter's selection reforms, including his two succes- 
sors, expressed disdain for the liberal activism of the Carter appointees and con- 
tended that they were not of the same high caliber as the judges who were selected 
during Reagan's presidency (Cohodas 1983, 83). 
Initially, a number of social scientists shared the general expectation that women 
on the federal bench would help to produce liberal decisions. Kritzer and Ulhman 
(1977), for example, wrote that, "Common sense as well as sociological theory sug- 
gests that the socialization experiences of men and women are significantly dif- 
ferent" (86). Those differences, combined with cultural norms, they argued, should 
lead to differences in judicial behavior. Goldman (1979) suggested that affirmative- 
action appointments could be expected to bring a heightened sensitivity to judicial 
resolution of questions of race and 'sex discrimination.3 
Empirical studies of differences in patterns of decision making among political 
elites other than judges provide only weak support for the initial expectations re- 
garding female judges. Leader's (1977) examination of interest group ratings of 
members of Congress led her to conclude that women were more liberal than men, 
particularly in the areas of social welfare and defense spending.4 Welch (1985), 
who analyzed Conservative Coalition scores, found that women were more likely 
than men to cast liberal votes, but that the differences had decreased over time. In 
contrast, studies of the views of political party elites (Constantini and Craik 1972) 
and civil servants (Thompson 1978) failed to reveal significant differences based 
on the sex of the decision maker. Thomas (1987) found that women legislators in 
California were no more liberal than their male counterparts while Thomas and 
Welch (1991) concluded that women legislators in 12 states were only slightly 
more likely than men to give higher priority to women's issues than to business 
and commerce. 
To date, systematic analyses of judicial behavior have failed to provide much 
more support for the contention that women judges will differ from their male 
3Additionally, Martin (1982) predicted that the women appointed by Carter would help create a 
more liberal judicial policy toward women. 
4A factor analysis of congressional voting from 1961 to 1975 led Frankovic (1977) to similar conclusions. 
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counterparts than the studies of other political elites. For example, two studies of 
the sentencing patterns of urban trial court judges revealed no significant differ- 
ences between males and females (Kritzer and Uhlman 1977; Gruhl, Spohn, and 
Welch 1981). The results of those studies, however, may not be generalizable to 
the quite different context of decision-making by federal appellate judges. Still, 
two studies of voting behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals revealed 
only slight differences between men and women judges (Gottschall 1983; Davis 
1986). In contrast Allen and Wall (1987), who examined the votes of judges on 
four state supreme courts, found that four of the five women voted on "women's 
issues" in a way that placed them at the liberal extreme of their respective courts. 
While Allen and Wall's (1987) study provides partial support for the expectation 
that women judges will be more liberal than their male colleagues, it is limited by 
the small number of women and the small number of cases included in the study5 
and the absence of controls for the partisan background of the judges. 
In the most ambitious attempt to date to determine the effects of women judges, 
Walker and Barrow (1985) compared the decisions of male and female judges 
on the federal district courts. Their results in cases involving criminal procedure 
paralleled those of the earlier sentencing studies: there were no significant differ- 
ences between men and women judges. Likewise, in cases that involved women's 
policy issues there were no significant differences. In the area of personal liberties 
and minority policy issues, however, the differences between male and female 
judges were statistically significant. Those differences were not in the expected 
direction-male judges were one and one-half times more likely than female judges 
.to support the liberal position. The results also indicated that female judges were 
significantly more likely than their male counterparts to defer to positions taken 
by government.6 As the authors noted, "such patterns could not have been pre- 
dicted from the political rhetoric expressed during the debate over the diversifica- 
tion of the federal bench" (Walker and Barrow 1985, 608). 
Feminist Legal Theory 
The existing empirical studies of differences in patterns of decision making be- 
tween male and female political elites provide very little support for a hypothesis 
that women judges on the Courts of Appeals will be more liberal than their male 
counterparts. Still, a number of scholars have theorized that women judges will 
differ in fundamental ways from their male colleagues. Feminist legal scholars 
argue that women lawyers and judges will bring a different perspective to the law, 
employ a different set of methods, and seek different results than the (male) legal 
tradition would seem to mandate. The well-known work of psychologist Gilligan 
'The number of cases ranged from 10 to 14 cases for each court. 
6In still another study, Gryski, Main, and Dixon (1986) found only a weak and statistically insignifi- 
cant relationship between the presence of a female judge and state high court decision making in sex 
discrimination cases. 
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(1982) provides some empirical support for the claims that feminist legal theory 
makes. Gilligan (1982) discovered differences in the ways that males and females 
understand themselves and their environment, and the way they resolve moral 
problems. She found that males tend to define themselves through separation, 
measure themselves against an abstract ideal of perfection, and equate adulthood 
with autonomy and individual achievement; they conceive morality in hierarchical 
terms-a ladder. In contrast, females often define themselves through connection 
with others and activities of care, and perceive morality in terms of a web. 
How might the differences that Gilligan (1982) found manifest themselves in 
judging? Karst (1984) asserted that women's perspective would alter the male 
conception of freedom that shaped the values of the Constitution. He reasoned 
that principles of liberty, property, due process, and equality traditionally have 
represented guarantees of protection from interference by others; they express a 
desire for separation from government as individual liberties rather than as col- 
lective rights. But women judges could transform those principles by integrating 
such values as connection, caring, and responsibility. Thus, the state could ac- 
quire an affirmative duty to ensure that each of its members has the ability to 
participate fully in the community. Binion (1991, 9) asserted that integrating 
women's experience into constitutional analysis is likely to result in a reformula- 
tion of rights analysis to redefine liberty as more than protection from govern- 
ment and to reconceptualize the nature of community. Sherry (1986) also drew 
on Gilligan's work to identify characteristics of what she referred to as a feminine 
jurisprudence. A jurisprudence that emphasizes connection (in contrast to auton- 
omy), context (as opposed to fixed rules), and responsibility (in contrast to rights) 
would be feminine but, she pointed out, not necessarily feminist. Nor would it 
necessarily be liberal but would "encompass aspects of personality and relation- 
ship to the world that have nothing to do with one's political preferences" (Sherry 
1986, 583). According to Sherry (1986), Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's decision 
making manifests a jurisprudence that differs clearly from that of her male col- 
leagues. O'Connor, in Sherry's assessment, has not been as willing as the other 
conservatives on the Court to permit violations of the right to full membership 
in the community. Moreover, she has tended to support individual rights only 
when they implicate membership in the community. O'Connor's decision mak- 
ing also has reflected a view that shaping the values of the community through 
governmental processes is an important function of community members (Sherry 
1986, 603). 
It is important to note that feminist legal theory makes no claim that the differ- 
ences between men and women judges will emerge simply as liberal or conserva- 
tive voting patterns across the board. The theory suggests that women judges will 
be liberal insofar as they will vote to support claimants who allege discrimination 
that has resulted in exclusion from full participation in the community. In con- 
trast, women judges would be categorized as conservative on the basis of their 
votes in cases in which individual rights conflict with community interests. 
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Methodology and Framework 
We have formulated three alternative sets of hypotheses based on the predic- 
tions of supporters of diversification on the federal bench and social scientists, em- 
pirical analyses of voting behavior, and feminist legal theory. First, the initial 
predictions about women judges led us to hypothesize that they will be more lib- 
eral than their male counterparts across the three issue areas that we have included 
in our analysis: search and seizure, obscenity, and employment discrimination.7 
Women, the early predictions implied, would be more protective of civil liberties 
because they are likely to have particular empathy for individuals who are disad- 
vantaged (as women themselves have been) in American society. 
In contrast, the empirical studies of voting behavior led us to our second hy- 
pothesis: female judges will not be more liberal than their male counterparts in 
any of the three issues areas. Regardless of the extent to which their early social- 
ization differed from that of their male colleagues, their common socialization into 
the legal subculture and the partisan and contextual pressures from the democra- 
tic subculture which cut across gender lines tend to cancel out any gender-based 
differences. 
Feminist legal theory provides the basis for our third set of hypotheses. Women 
judges will be more conservative in obscenity cases than their male counterparts- 
explicit sexual materials may be viewed as perpetuating the oppression of women 
and as damaging to the moral fiber of the community. They will be no more likely 
than their male counterparts to support the liberal position in search and sei- 
zure cases-to support the claim of a criminal defendant would conflict with the 
interests of the community. Finally, women will be more liberal than men in em- 
ployment discrimination cases as women tend to emphasize rights that are inter- 
dependent, such as full membership in the community. Discrimination may be 
viewed as a problem of exclusion. 
The present study takes as its unit of analysis the votes of all regular judges of 
the United States Courts of Appeals, including those on senior status, from the 
District of Columbia Circuit and the 11 numbered circuits from 1981 to 1990. We 
excluded from analysis the votes of judges from other courts who temporarily par- 
ticipated on appeals court panels. The analysis of obscenity cases is based on all 
opinions published in the Federal Reporter during this period. These opinions 
contained 239 votes that were suitable for analysis.8 Since there were more than 
3,000 published opinions in the decade studied for both search and seizure and 
7As noted later, fully specified models of judicial voting behavior require the inclusion of controls 
for specific case facts and the nature of the particular types of litigants who appear in court. To prop- 
erly specify such case facts, narrowly defined case types must be chosen for analysis. Previous work has 
shown that obscenity and search and seizure cases meet this criterion (see Hagle 1991; McGuire 1990; 
Songer and Haire 1992; Segal 1984). 
8Cases which had missing data for one or more of the variables were excluded from the logistic 
regression. 
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employment discrimination cases, samples of each case type were drawn for 
analysis. First, for the employment discrimination cases, a search utilizing the 
WESTLAW electronic data base identified the universe of cases whose decisions 
were published in the Federal Reporter. From the universe of cases, a random 
sample of 200 decisions was selected. But since the proportion of votes cast by 
women judges remains low, such a sample would produce too few votes by women 
to permit satisfactory analysis. Therefore, the original sample of 200 cases was 
supplemented by identifying the universe of cases in which each woman judge 
participated and randomly selecting three additional cases from the universe of 
participations of each woman (in these three cases selected for each woman, the 
votes of all judges were coded). For search and seizure cases, a random sample of 
40 cases per year which had been drawn for another project was employed. These 
samples yielded 1,158 votes in search and seizure cases suitable for analysis and 
607 votes in employment discrimination cases.9 
To test our hypotheses, we coded the dependent variable "1" for a liberal vote 
and "0" for a conservative vote. Votes which could not be unambiguously classi- 
fied as either liberal or conservative (e.g., those to affirm in part and reverse in 
part) were excluded from analysis. For obscenity cases, we adopted the definition 
of a "liberal" vote, employed in recent empirical studies of the obscenity decisions 
of appellate courts (Songer and Haire 1992; Hagle 1991; Dudley 1989). Thus, a 
vote to support a nonrestrictive position on the use and dissemination of allegedly 
obscene materials (e.g., overturning an obscenity conviction or concluding that a 
challenged book was not obscene) is liberal. For search and seizure decisions, we 
defined a liberal vote as one in favor of holding that a search was unreasonable or 
that challenged evidence must not be used.10 For job discrimination cases, we de- 
fined a liberal vote as one which supported the claimant.11 
In order to assess gender-based effects while controlling for a large number of 
independent variables we employed logit in a multivariate analysis. Logit, which is 
preferred to regression when the dependent variable is dichotomous (Aldrich and 
Nelson 1984), permits the calculation of a maximum-likelihood coefficient for the 
effect that each independent variable has on the probability that the dependent 
variable will assume a specified value (in the analysis below, on the probability of a 
liberal vote). 
9The limitation of the analysis to published opinions means that some caution must be exercised be- 
fore generalizing from these results to all cases. It would be prohibitively expensive to sample the un- 
published decisions of the courts, and we have no way to know for certain whether the effect of gender is 
the same in published and unpublished decisions. Songer (1988, 1990) found that for other indicators of 
judicial values, the relationship between values and votes was in the same direction in published and un- 
published decisions. Therefore, we suspect that the effect of gender would be similar in unpublished de- 
cisions, but the magnitude of that effect may be less in unpublished than in published decisions because 
unpublished decisions are likely to contain fewer opportunities for exercise of judicial discretion. 
'?That is, we adopted the definition employed by Segal (1984) but reversed the order of votes coded 
as "1" and "O." 
I In claims brought by a male challenging an affirmative-action plan, we coded a vote in favor of the 
male plaintiff as conservative. 
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We constructed a separate model for each of our three issue areas. A number 
of studies suggest that judicial values reflected in regional differences and parti- 
san appointment patterns are strongly related to the votes of judges (Tate and 
Handberg 1991; Songer and Davis 1990; Howard 1981). Therefore, for each model 
we included a measure of region (1 = South, non-South = 0) and a variable to rep- 
resent presidential appointment. The appointment variable was coded "1" if the 
judge was appointed by a "liberal ideology conscious president," "-1" if appoint- 
ment by a "conservative ideology conscious president" and "O" if appointed by a 
president who was not ideology conscious."2 We also included fact patterns of 
cases and the nature of the litigants in each model. Recent analyses of both search 
and seizure decisions of the Supreme Court (Segal 1984) and of the obscenity de- 
cisions of a wide spectrum of appellate courts (Songer and Haire 1992; McGuire 
1990; Hagle 1989; Dudley 1989) suggest that differences in the fact patterns of 
cases before appellate courts may explain a substantial portion of the variance in 
the decisions of the courts and the votes of individual judges. Similarly, recent 
studies (Songer and Sheehan 1992; Songer and Haire 1992; Wheeler et al. 1987) 
demonstrate that the nature of the litigants involved in a case affect the likelihood 
of a liberal vote even after controls are introduced for other case characteristics 
and the backgrounds of judges. That is, the likelihood that a given judge will sup- 
port the liberal position may be significantly affected by the specific case charac- 
teristics; and this effect may be independent of any gender effects. 
To identify the most important case characteristics for obscenity and search and 
seizure cases, we relied on existing models. For obscenity cases, we selected the 
case characteristics that Songer and Haire (1992) have found to have the greatest 
impact on the voting of appeals court judges. Thus, we coded whether the litigant 
opposing the government was an individual or a bookstore, the nature of the 
allegedly obscene material, and whether the distribution of the material was re- 
stricted to adults. For search and seizure cases, we adapted Segal's (1984) fact- 
pattern model, coding case facts relating to the location of the search, the extent of 
the search, whether there was a warrant or probable cause, and whether or not any 
of the exceptions to the warrant requirement were present.13 
12This classification of presidents is derived from that employed by Tate and Handberg (1991). We 
coded Carter, who was not included in the Handberg and Tate classification, as a liberal ideology- 
conscious president. 
'3Segal (1984) defined probable cause and the arrest variables as the proportion of judges below who 
found that there was probable cause or that the arrest was lawful. Since for our data all cases came from 
a single judge decision of the district court, the values for these variables could only take on the values "1" 
if the district court found probable cause, etc., or "O" if the district found that there was no probable 
cause. Segal's (1984) exception variable was simply the total number, out of a maximum of six that he 
coded, of exceptions that were present. While maintaining the basic format of the variable, we coded two 
additional exceptions that were recognized by the Supreme Court subsequent to the time of Segal's (1984) 
study; a good faith exception and the inevitable discovery exception. It is unclear from Segal (1984) 
whether these exceptions were coded as present if the Supreme Court concluded that they were present 
or the lower courts made such a determination. For our coding, we relied on the determination of the dis- 
trict court (as reported in the appeals court's opinion) as to whether or not a given exception was present. 
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For employment discrimination cases, we constructed a model based on our 
analysis of recent opinions of the Supreme Court. We focused on the findings of 
the trial court in the following areas: evidence at trial of past discrimination, the 
nature of the alleged discrimination, effect on seniority rights, and the nature of 
the relief sought. To this fact-pattern model, we added the variables for region 
and presidential appointment used in the models of search and seizure and ob- 
scenity decisions. Finally, to assess the effects of litigant status, we included an in- 
dication of whether the plaintiff was identifiably poor and whether the defendant 
was either a business or a government. 
In summary, each of the three models includes identical measures of region, the 
appointing president of each judge who participated on the panel, and the gender 
of each judge. The models also contain variables which attempt to tap the most 
relevant case characteristics for each of the three areas of law investigated. Since 
statutes and precedents in these three areas are different, the case characteristics 
included in the three models are necessarily different. As a result, the models are 
not identical. Due to this use of partially different models for the three issue areas, 
some caution is necessary when interpreting the relative impact of gender in the 
three areas. Unfortunately, there appears to be no way around this dilemma. If 
case facts were omitted from the models in order to produce identical models for 
each issue area, the models would be seriously underspecified and any relation- 
ships discovered between gender and judicial voting decisions might be spurious. 
Results 
We examined the impact of gender on judges' behavior separately in each of 
three categories of cases with controls for case facts as well as region and presiden- 
tial appointment. The model for judges' votes in obscenity cases is presented in 
table 1. 
The model does a very good job of predicting the votes of the judges. Overall, 
the model correctly predicts 86.2% of the judges' votes in the universe of pub- 
lished obscenity decisions that we examined, a reduction in error of 53.2%.14 Both 
the presidential appointment variable and region were significant predictors of 
judges' votes. Additionally, the type of litigant and various case facts proved to be 
important. However, as table 1 shows, the gender of the judge appears to have no 
effect on the likelihood of a liberal vote when other factors are taken into account. 
The coefficient for gender is small and statistically insignificant. Moreover, the ad- 
dition of gender to the model adds nothing to the predictive power of the model. 
'4The reduction-in-error figure is a measure of the improvement in the prediction of the values of the 
dependent variable that is provided by the model compared to the predictions that would be made by the 
naive strategy of predicting that the value for every case was the value reflected by the modal value of 
the dependent variable. It is the proportion of the error made in the naive prediction that is eliminated 
by the model. A commonly accepted formula for computation of the reduction in error (ROE) is: ROE = 
100 (% correctly classified - % in the modal category) / (100% - % in the modal category). 
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TABLE 1 
LOGIT COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LIKELIHOOD OF A LIBERAL VOTE 
OBSCENITY CASES, 1981-1990 
Independent Variables MLE SE 
Intercept -4.672 
Region 1.240 0.52** 
Appt. pres. 1.118 0.26*** 
Bookstore 3.892 0.96*** 
Individual -1.885 0.56*** 
Film -1.408 0.49** 
Prior 1.592 0.58*** 
Adult 3.958 1.10*** 
Magazine -1.503 0.51** 
Judge gender -0.709 0.85 
% Categorized correctly - 86.2% (false positive = 20.0%; false negative = 11.6%). 
Reduction in error = 53.2%. 
-2 x LLR = 144.92. 
Model chi square = 109.93, df = 9, p < .0001. 
Number of cases = 210, mean of dependent variable = .295. 
significant at .05; "significant at .01; ***significant at .001. 
When the model was re-run without the variable for gender, the percentage of 
votes categorized correctly and the reduction in error were precisely the same as 
before. Therefore, no gender-based differences appear to exist in the voting be- 
havior of judges in obscenity cases. 
The effect of judges' gender on votes in search and seizure cases is presented in 
table 2. The model is statistically significant and successful in predicting almost 
90.0% of the votes. In general, the results are consistent with Segal's (1984) find- 
ings for the Supreme Court. The case facts that had the biggest impact on the 
probability of a liberal vote were the existence of a search warrant, a finding of 
probable cause by the trial court, or a trial court finding that one or more generally 
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement existed. 
Once again, the addition of the gender of judges to the model has no discernible 
effect. The coefficient for gender is small and does not approach statistical signifi- 
cance. Moreover, when the model was re-run without a variable for the gender of 
the judges, there was no reduction in the predictive accuracy of the model. Thus, 
it appears that the gender of a judge is unrelated to voting behavior in search and 
seizure cases.15 
'50ne initially troubling aspect of the model displayed in table 2 is that there appears to be very little 
reduction in error over the accuracy that could be obtained by predicting that every vote would be con- 
servative. Thus, some caution is necessary when generalizing about gender effects from these results. 
The failure of the model to produce a reduction in error appears to be due to the extreme skew of the 
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TABLE 2 
LOGIT COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LIKELIHOOD OF A LIBERAL VOTE 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES, 1981-1990 
Independent Variables MLE SE 
Intercept - 1.390 
Region -0.107 0.22 
Appt. pres. 0.365 0.12** 
Home 0.162 0.25 
Business 0.532 0.34 
Extent 0.176 0.33 
ProbCaus -0.571 0.24** 
Warrant -0.793 0.29** 
Except -0.953 0.21*** 
Judge gender -0.136 0.35 
% Categorized correctly = 89.4% (false positive = 10.6%; false negative = 0.0%). 
Reduction in error = 0%. 
-2 x LLR = 625.32. 
Model chi square = 45.21, df= 9, p < .0001. 
Number of cases = 994, mean of dependent variable = .105. 
significant at .05; "significant at .01; ***significant at .001. 
The results of the test of the effects of gender on employment discrimination 
cases are displayed in table 3. The model is successful in predicting 70.9% of the 
votes and produces a reduction in error of 40.7%. As expected, presidential ap- 
pointment effects are strong. Moreover, several case facts and litigant characteris- 
tics significantly affect the probability of a liberal vote. 
Further examination of table 3 reveals that, in sharp contrast to the results in 
obscenity and search and seizure cases, the coefficient for gender is positive, ro- 
bust, and statistically significant. Thus, it appears that the gender of the judge is 
strongly related to the probability of a liberal vote in job discrimination cases. 
Having established that judges' gender has a statistically significant impact on 
their votes, we now ask, in probabilistic terms, what is the magnitude of this effect 
after the model has controlled for the effects of case facts, litigant characteristics, 
and presidential appointment? To answer this question, we computed the esti- 
mated probability of a liberal vote for male judges and for female judges using the 
dependent variable (89% of the votes uphold the validity of the search). To provide at least a partial 
test of this hunch, we adopted the strategy utilized by Songer and Sheehan (1992, 249). We selected a 
new sample with a dependent variable that was not skewed by combining all of the liberal votes with a 
random 11% sample of the conservative votes. The model was then re-run on this new sample. The 
model for this new sample correctly predicted 66.7% of the votes and had a reduction in error of 
32.3%. Judge gender in this new model still had little impact (MLE = -0.12), was statistically insignifi- 
cant, and increased neither the proportion of votes categorized correctly nor the reduction in error. 
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TABLE 3 
LOGIT COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LIKELIHOOD OF A LIBERAL VOTE 
JOB DISCRIMINATION CASES, 1981-1990 
Independent Variables MLE SE 
Intercept -3.136 
Region 0.081 0.25 
Appt. pres. 0.570 0.12*** 
Amicus 2.539 0.65*** 
Poor -1.058 0.53* 
Govt defend 2.328 0.71*** 
Business 2.423 0.70*** 
RaceDis 0.781 0.27** 
Handicap -1.335 0.55* 
SexDis 1.714 0.38*** 
PastDis 2.601 0.84** 
Evidence 0.771 0.26** 
Seniority -2.405 0.90" 
Prefer 0.931 0.89 
Judge gender 0.758 0.34* 
% Categorized correctly = 70.9% (false positive = 29.2%; false negative = 29.0%). 
Reduction in error = 40.7%. 
-2 x LLR = 453.24. 
Model chi square = 127.50, df = 16,p < .0001. 
Number of cases = 419, mean of dependent variable = .491. 
*significant at .05; **significant at .01; ***significant at .001. 
MLE coefficients for each of the other independent variables reported in table 3 
together with the mean values of those variables. When the values of all the other 
independent variables are set at their mean, the probability that a male judge will 
cast a liberal vote is 38% while the estimated probability of a liberal vote by a fe- 
male judge is 75%. Thus, the impact of gender appears to be quite substantial. 
Finally, we sought to determine whether the greater propensity of female judges 
to cast liberal votes was due to greater sympathy for the victims of gender discrimi- 
nation (as expected by political activists) or whether it reflected a more general 
orientation toward equal protection. To obtain a rough answer to this question, we 
conducted two supplemental analyses. First, we re-ran the model described in 
table 3 for the subset of cases that did not raise any gender discrimination claims 
(e.g., race discrimination cases). The results suggest that gender-based differences 
among judges persist even in cases involving allegations of employment discrimi- 
nation not related to sex. Overall, the model for nongender cases is very similar to 
that for the larger sample of all employment discrimination cases. The model pre- 
dicts 71.8% of the votes correctly, with a reduction in error of 36.9%, nearly iden- 
tical to the results for the full sample of discrimination cases. More importantly, 
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gender of the judge continued to be strongly related to judicial votes, with a coeffi- 
cient of 0.692, significant at the .051 level and only slightly smaller in magnitude 
than the coefficient for gender in the model for all discrimination cases. 
As a second test of whether the greater liberalism of female judges was pri- 
marily due to sympathy for the victims of gender discrimination, we re-ran the 
model presented in table 3 with the addition of a multiplicative term for the inter- 
action between gender of the judge and the variable "sex discrimination." In this 
revised model, both the gender of the judge and type of case (sex discrimination or 
other types of discrimination) remain statistically significant and of approximately 
the same magnitude as they were in the model presented in table 3.16 But the in- 
teraction between the two variables is very small17 and statistically insignificant. 
This suggests that whether the case involves gender discrimination or some other 
type of discrimination does not affect the greater propensity of female than male 
judges to cast a liberal vote. 
DISCUSSION 
The results of our analysis of obscenity and search and seizure cases suggest 
that there are no differences in the voting behavior of male and female judges. In 
employment discrimination cases, however, our results were quite different. Fe- 
male judges were more likely than their male colleagues to support the alleged vic- 
tim of discrimination. In sum, our analysis indicates that the introduction of 
women judges to the federal appellate bench has had a substantial impact on deci- 
sion making in employment discrimination cases but no measurable effect on 
search and seizure and obscenity cases. Clearly, the effect of gender on judicial be- 
havior varies with the context of the decision-making process. This finding does 
not support the sets of hypotheses derived either from the expectations of the ac- 
tivists or from the earlier empirical analyses. 
Among the alternative sets of hypotheses, only feminist legal theory recog- 
nizes that the behavior of women judges would not be confined to a single liberal- 
conservative dimension across issue areas. Although the results did not completely 
support the theoretical expectations associated with feminist jurisprudence, the 
analysis suggests that women judges will speak in a "different voice" when dealing 
with claims of discrimination. It is possible that the socialization of women who 
attend law school and pursue legal careers that culminate in federal judicial ap- 
pointments subverts tendencies to express concerns for relationships and commu- 
nity rather than autonomy and individual rights. But that socialization, effective as 
it may be in thoroughly grounding lawyers in established methods of legal reason- 
ing, may not be strong enough to overcome the concern women have for people 
16The MLE for gender of judge increases slightly to 0.783, significant to the .05 level, while the 
MLE for sex discrimination increases to 1.903, significant at .001. 
17MLE = 0.011, standard error = 0.828. 
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who have been targets of discrimination when their claims raise the interdepen- 
dent right to full membership in the community. 
Alternatively, it is possible that women judges do not bring a distinct perspec- 
tive to judging. If so, the differences we found in voting patterns between women 
and men in employment discrimination cases may simply be a result of women 
judges' identification with other victims of discrimination. Thus, women judges' 
support for claimants in employment discrimination cases may simply reflect a 
concern for protecting individual rights in an area of particular salience to them, 
rather than a concern for connection, context, and responsibility. 
The results of our analysis should be interpreted with caution. This study was 
confined to three narrowly defined issue areas. Moreover, the need to control ex- 
plicitly for case content led us to develop models that contain different variables 
associated with the specific policy areas. Nevertheless, the results of this study, 
and other empirical analyses, represent a starting point for research on women 
judges. Women judges in significant numbers are so new to the legal system that, 
although it is now possible to begin to study their decision making, it is not yet 
within our reach to assess the extent of their impact with certainty. In time, as 
more women assume positions on the federal courts and as the decisions of women 
who are currently serving continue to accumulate, further research that reaches 
firm conclusions will become feasible. Such research must include analysis of vot- 
ing behavior and judicial reasoning as well as the career patterns and socialization 
of women judges. 
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